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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
Q. T. SHEPHERD, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MAX B. HOLBROOK, and 
BLANCHE C. HOLBROOK, 
his wife, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8549 
li~ ( .,._ .. ~ ., . :f BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The respondents here accept the statement of 
plaintiff and appellant Shepherd with three signifi-
cant qualifications : ( 1 ) Contrary to appellant's 
brief the judgment of the trial court was not a 
cryptic one sentence, but is set out in five para-
graphs, (R. p 15-16) and was based upon extensive 
findings of fact and conclusions of law (R. p 9-14). 
(2) The effect of Paragraph 10 of the agreement 
between respondents Holbrook and the Barkers (Ex-
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hi bit 1) is more clearly understood if set forth in 
full. It provides : 
"10. The buyers agree to farm and op-
erate the chicken farm near Topaz, Utah in 
an efficient, economical and husbandlike man-
ner and to maintain at all times, until the 
sellers are paid in full, approximately 8,000 
laying chickens." (Emphasis added) 
(3) Respondents have not only contended that legal 
title is in them as to the chickens subject to the 
contract of sale, but they have also asserted that 
in any event they hold a security interest in the 
chickens on the ranch, of which plaintiff had knowl-
edge (Amended Answer, 4th Defense, R. p 8). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Certain modifications of appellant Shepherd's 
statement of facts are necessary. The respondents 
dispute that three-fourths (%) of the purchase 
price was paid by buyers as down payment on the 
ranch. This statement is based upon an incidental 
self-serving statement of the buyer unsupported by 
any substantial evidence. (R. p 79; Tr. p 63) 
It should also be noted that the monthly pay-
ments to be made by the buyer on the unpaid balance 
of $12,266.55, plus interest were to be a minimum 
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of $100 a month and not wholly out of "net in-
come" as indicated in appellant's brief. 
Moreover, the assertion that appellant did "on 
the faith of the note and chattel mortgage" extend 
further credit to Barker is unsupported by the evi-
dence and irrelevant here. Appellant in fact never 
made any attempt to tie subsequent credit granted 
to Barker to his chattel mortgage by which he at-
tempted to secure previous credit advances. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT TOOK HIS MORTGAGE SUBJECT 
TO THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF RESPONDENTS. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT HAD NOTICE OF RESPONDENTS' 
SECURITY INTEREST. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT'S MORTGAGE IS SUBORDINATE TO 
RESPONDENTS' INTEREST BECAUSE IT WAS EX-
ECUTED FOR PAST CONSIDERATION. 
POINT IV. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR AS TO QUESTIONS OF 
EVIDENCE. 
POINT V. 
THERE IS NO RIGHT OF SALE WHICH EFFECTS 
THE PRIORITY OF APPELLANT AND RESPOND-
ENTS. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT TOOK HIS MORTGAGE SUBJECT 
TO THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF RESPONDENTS. 
No one has ever disputed the validity of 
appellant's mortgage. The sole issue in this lawsuit 
was whether this mortgage was subordinate to the 
interest of the Holbrooks in the same chickens. Ap-
pellant devotes his argument to the location of that 
illusive concept "title" and thereby seeks to resolve 
this case on the basis of legal semantics. It would 
be better to return to basic fundamentals. It is our 
contention that it is unimportant where "title" to 
the chickens is, or whether respondents' interest 
is that of a conditional vendor or whether it is that 
of an equitable mortgagee. In either case appellant 
was a mortgagee with notice of this interest and 
took his interest subject to it. 
As this court knows, sellers in the State of 
Utah, of both real and personal property, have 
shown marked preference for the use of title retain-
ing techniques to give them security for their un-
paid purchase price, rather than real or chattel 
mortgages. In the instant case, the Holbrooks sold 
a stocked chicken ranch (which obviously comprises 
both land and chickens.) There were 8, 000 laying 
hens on the property at the time. These hens repre-
sented a substantial portion of the value of the 
property, not only because of their worth per unit, 
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but because together they constituted a going con-
cern. The buyers gave the sellers certain real pro-
perty as down payment and agreed to pay the un-
paid balance of $12,266.55, together with interest 
in minimum installment payments of $100.00 per 
month. The buyer agreed by contract to keep the 
same number of chickens on the property at all 
times and the con tract further provided that, in the 
event of default in payment by the buyers, the sellers 
could re-enter and take possession of the "premises". 
Appellant contends this contract only gave 
the sellers the right to re-enter the ground. He 
springs on the use of the word "premises" and 
seeks to restrict this term to real property only. 
He argues that "premises" should be restricted 
in meaning so that the sellers' security was only 
that of returning to a denuded farm robbed of its 
principal asset. Buyer and seller alike admit that 
they intended no such restrictive interpretation 
and respondents vigorously maintain that the con-
tract says no such thing. 
It is well established that the meaning of the 
term "premises" is dependent on the circumstances 
in which it is used and has no fixed legal signifi-
cance.O'Connor v. Great Lakes Pipe Line Company, 
( CCA 8, 1933) 63 Fed. 2nd, 523, 526. In Bankers' 
Trust Company v. Maxson, (1926) 100 N.J.E. 1, 
134 Atlantic, 875, 878, the Court held that, whenever 
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a mortgage is made upon goods and chattels and the 
bill prays for the sale of the mortgaged premises, 
the "premises" mentioned would include both the 
real estate and the chattels described in the mort-
gage. As a Texas court has held, "the word premises 
has, in legal parlance, a meaning so broad and varied 
that its interpretation in a given case, is to a great 
extent governed by the context". Comeaux v. State 
(1931) 118 Tex. Cr. 223, 42 S.W. 2d 255, 258. See 
also Leach Co. v. Trace ( 1929) 199 Wis. 292, 226 
N.W. 308 where a contract of sale of both real and 
personal property provided that title to the "pre-
mises" should not be vested in the buyer until pay-
ment. The court held that the seller retained an in-
terest in the personal property superior to attaching 
creditors. 
Not only did the buyer and seller not intend 
the term to be so restricted, but no person could, in 
the light of the general nature of the contract, 
reasonably think that a seller would so restrict his 
security. Such an interpretation ignores and makes 
unnecessary the convent to maintain 8,000 birds 
at all times until the Holbrooks were paid in full. 
For what other purpose would such a clause appear 
in a con tract? 
It is submitted that the only reasonable inter-
pretation to be placed on this contract was that the 
sellers reserved the right to resume possession of 
the ranch, chickens and all. This meaning is clear 
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regardless of where "title" to the chickens is or was. 
As the contract was to run for many years 
beyond the life of a chicken, it was obvious that de-
fendants may have had to resume posession of the 
ranch at a time when the original number had been 
replaced by other chickens. The buyer would have 
had to so replace them in order to comply with the 
covenant to maintain the same number of chickens. 
But the fact remains that sellers reserved the 
right to repossess at any time on default as security 
for the unpaid purchase price. Whether we label 
this a conditional sale or an equitable mortgage, it 
is in any case, clearly a security interest reserved 
in the sellers. 
As Shepherd concedes, what is covered by the 
contra~ depends on the intention of the parties as 
gathered from the language of the agreement con-
sidered with reference to the situations of the parties 
and their objects. (Appellant's Brief p. 8) 
"In determining whether a transaction is 
a sale or a mortgage, the intention of the 
parties as ascertained from the whole trans-
action is controlling." 14 Q.J.S. page 583. 
"An instrument by which one party 
agrees to sell, and the other to purchase, cer-
tain personal property, and which provides 
that the vendor shall have a lien on the pro-
perty until the purchase price is paid, is in 
the nature of a mortgage ... " 14 C.J.S. page 
586. 
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Here is an interest in the chickens which a 
court would unquestionably protect as between buyer 
and seller. 
Now how does this security interest of defen-
dants affect a third party? The trial court express-
ly found that a "reasonably prudent person in these 
circumstances would have made inquiry of defen-
dants (the Holbrooks) as to the security interest 
of defendants in the chickens" (Finding of Fact 
#11). Assuming therefore that appellant had been 
a lender carefully examining title prior to making 
a loan, even then, the trial court has found that w.i.th 
the facts at his command he would have had notice 
of the Holbrook's interest imposed upon hir11 as a 
matter of law. 
But appellant does not even occupy this cate-
gory. Shepherd, as a feed man, extended credit to 
the buyer. The amount of credit began to soar dan-
gerously. As his position became more precarious, 
Shepherd sought desperately for a means of secur-
ing this past indebtedness. 
Appellant at that time, as the trial court has 
found, knew that the buyers were purchasing the 
ranch on contract from the Holbrooks. (Finding of 
Fact # 10) He examined the chattel mortgage re-
cords and found that the contract had not been filed. 
Despite appellant's knowledge of the existence of a 
contract and his familiarity with the poultry busi-
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ness, and his admission that the poultry on a stocked 
turkey farm constitutes a substantial portion of 
the value of such farm (R. p 51; Tr p 35), he at no 
time inquired of the Holbrooks as to whether they 
had any interest in such property. Indeed, why 
should appellant have inquired? He was not care-
fully checking ti tie prior to making a loan. He was 
a worried creditor happy to take whatever security 
he could get from a failing debtor and he finally 
succeeded in obtaining the chatel mortgage. Sub-
sequently, he found what he felt was a sufficient 
ambiguity in respondents' asserted security interest 
that he thought would warrant litigation. But ap-
pellant himself admits that he was in no way induced 
by the alleged ambiguity to enter into the trans-
action. He claims that he had never read the con-
tract. (The buyer testified that he had, in fact, 
shown .the contract to plaintiff prior to the signing 
of the chattel mortgage with plaintiff. (R. p. 71-72; 
Tr. p. 55-56). 
The basic issue of this action, then, resolves 
itself to this: Even assuming that legal "title" was 
not in respondents as to the replaced chickens, they 
clearly had an equitable security interest in these. 
What are their rights, as opposed to appellant, to 
the chickens where this security interest was not 
filed in accordance with the provisions of our chattel 
mortgage legislation? 
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POINT II. 
APPELLANT HAD NOTICE OF RESPONDENTS' 
SECURITY INTEREST. 
It is, of course, well established that the filing 
statutes only protect a subsequent mortgagee from 
previous unfiled mortgages if he is a mortgagee in 
good faith for value without" notice. (Volker Lum-
ber Co. v. Utah and Oregon Lumber Company, 
(1915) 45 Utah 603, 148 Pac. 365); Deseret Bank v. 
Kidman, (1903) 25 Utah 379, 71 Pac. 873. Pul-
sipher v. Chinn, (1927) 69 Utah 401, 255 Pac. 439). 
Plaintiff does not meet these requirements and thus 
does not receive the protection of the statute. 
The trial court, in the light of all the evidence, 
found that "a reasonably prudent person in these 
circumstances would have made inquiry of defen-
dants as to the security interest of defendants in 
the chickens". (Finding of Fact # 11) By reason 
of this, the trial court has concluded that appellant 
had constructive notice of the interest of defendants. 
(Conclusion of Law No. 1) This finding in itself 
subordinates appellant to the Holbrooks without 
any further discussion. 
One court has summed up this situation ad-
mirably when it said : 
On the other hand the proposition is es-
tablished by an absolute unanimity of author-
ity and is equally true both in its application 
10 
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to constructive notice and to actual notice not 
proved by direct evidence but inferred from 
circumstances, that if the party obtains 
knowledge or information of facts tending to 
show the existence of a prior right in conflict 
with the interest which he is seeking to ob-
tain, and which are sufficient to put a reason-
ably prudent man upon inquiry, then it may 
be a legitimate and perhaps even necessary 
inference that he acquired the further in-
formation which constitutes actual notice ... 
finally, if it appears that the party has knowl-
edge or information of facts sufficient to put 
a prudent man upon inquiry and that he 
wholly neglects to make any inquiry or, hav-
ing begun it, fails to prosecute it in a reason-
able manner, then also an inference of actual 
notice is necessary and absolute ... 
"How is Waddington's action to be re-
garded in equity? He proceeded to close the 
transaction regardless of the information he 
had. His reason for doing so is plain. He was 
not making a loan on behalf of his company. 
He was getting security for a pre-existing 
debt and naturally would take a second mort-
gage if he could do no better. Knowledge of 
the prior mortgage did not deter him because 
he was seeking a lien upon the interest the 
mortgagor had in the property mortgaged, 
whatever that interest might be." Cambridge 
Production Credit Assn. v. Patrick (Ohio) 
1942), 45 NE 2d 751, 144 ALR 323. 
11 
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POINT III. 
APPELLANT'S MORTGAGE IS SUBORDINATE TO 
RESPONDENTS' INTEREST BECAUSE IT WAS EX-
ECUTED FOR PAST CONSIDERATION. 
In addition to the above argument, it is well 
established that a mortgage for past consideration 
is subordinated to even nonrecord prior mortgagees. 
Here as the trial Court has found, the buyers 
of the ranch, "at plaintiff's request and to evidence 
said existing indebtedness ... ", executed a note for 
$4750.00 and "to secure said note, the Barkers 
executed to plaintiff a Crop and Chattel Iviortgage'). 
(Finding of Fact # 9) . 
"A mortgage without consideration must 
yield to one given on good consideration. A 
subsequent mortgage taken in consideration 
of an antecedent debt is inferior to a prior 
mortgage regardless of whether or not the 
first mortgage was recorded." 14 Corpus 
Juris Secundum page 927. 
"It is clear that a chattel mortgage given 
to secure a debt already owing by the mort-
gagor or by a third person is in all respects 
valid and binding as between the parties . . . 
A mortgagee taking a mortgage solely for an 
antecedent debt is, however, not deemed a 
bona fide purchaser or mortgagee for value. 
Such a mortgagee is not considered a mortga-
gee in good faith so as to be protected by the 
statutes requiring the filing and renewal of 
mortgages. He will take his mortgage subject 
to prior mortgages notwithstanding he has 
12 
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no notice thereof and they are not filed or 
renewed as required by law." Eager, The 
Law of Chattel Morgages and Conditional 
Sales, Dennis & Co. 1941, p. 4 7. 
"According to the weight of authority, 
a mortgage for a pre-existing debt does not 
constitute the mortgagee. a bona fide pur-
chaser or mortgagee for value ... " 10 Am. 
Jur. p. 852. 
The United States Supreme Court has affirmed 
this principle with regard to chattel mortgages. 
(People's Savings Bank v. Bates, 120 U. S. 556, 30 
Lawyer's Edition 754) In that case plaintiff took 
a chattel mortgage on February 7. On February 11 
the defendant bank took a chattel mortgage to se-
cure a certain past indebtedness of the debtor. De-
fendant bank filed its chattel mortgage prior to 
plaintiffs. The principal question to be decided was 
whether the defendant bank was a mortgagee in 
good faith and thus entitled to the protection of the 
filing statute. The defendant bank sought to apply 
cases applicable to negotiable instruments which 
held that the fact that the consideration was for 
past debts was not material. The United States Su-
preme Court expressly repudiated this and cited 
as the proper doctrine that "whatever the rule may 
be in the case of negotiable instruments, it is well 
settled that the conveyance of lands or chattels as 
security for an antecedent debt will not operate 
as a purchase for value or defeat existing equities." 
(Page 758, emphasis added.) 
13 
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It is obvious from these authorities that, 
whether or not plaintiff had actual or constructive 
notice in this case, he is precluded from asserting 
any priority because of the nature of the considera-
tion which was the basis for his mortgage. 
POINT IV. 
THERE WAS NO ERROR AS TO QUESTIONS OF 
EVIDENCE. 
Plain tiff expresses concern over the admission 
of certain testimony by the buyer and sellers as to 
their intent in making their contract and their un-
derstanding of its meaning. No one disputes the 
general rule that a document which is a full integra-
tion and is clear and unequivocal on its face cannot 
be varied by oral testimony as to the third party. 
But can anyone say that this document clearly and 
unequivocally provides that while the seller may re-
enter the bare land and resume possession of it, that 
he would have no control over or rights to its prin-
cipal asset, the chickens? It is submitted one cannot. 
To give plaintiff his fullest due, it can only be said 
that the contract is possibly ambiguous as to this 
point. (Although defendants do not concede that 
anyone applying common sense instead of tortuous 
legalism, could read this contract in its whole con-
text, and believe that it did not give defendants the 
security they claim). Assuming arguendo some am-
biguity, the trial court has found that plaintiff knew 
14 
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of this contract and had constructive notice of the 
interest of defendants. It has found that a reason-
ably prudent person would have inquired of defen-
dants as to their interests. Upon inquiry, defen-
dants, (the sellers) would have told the inquirer 
what they thought the contract meant and what they 
intended it to mean. Nor would the buyer disagree 
- he also believed that the con tract had only one 
meaning in this regard. Such testimony thus had 
direct bearing on the good faith of plaintiff, and 
of the nature of the notice he would have received if 
he had made inquiry. 
In addition, let us assume that a third party 
"P" wishes to plan a course of conduct, the success 
of which is dependent upon the meaning of a writing 
between "X" and "Y" who are accessible to "P". 
Although "X" and "Y" do not disagree at all as to 
the meaning of the writing, the writing is on its 
face ambiguous (i.e., it could reasonably be given 
one of two interpretations). Surely the third party 
cannot, to protect his own interests, place a dia-
metrically opposite interpretation on the contract 
and then subordinate the rights of "X" and "Y" 
thereto! 
If there had been disagreement between the 
contracting parties as to the meaning of a writing 
ambiguous on its face, then courts or third parties 
must look furtfi.er in interpreting the document and 
15 
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might have to rely upon legal presumptions. But, of 
course, this is just not the case here. 
Plaintiff refers to Rule 1 of Section 19 of the 
Uniform Sales Act (Section 60-2-3 Utah Code An-
notated 1953) to determine the intention of the 
parties here. First, it is questioned whether the sales 
act applies here- his contract was not essentially 
one for the sale of "goods", nor is it severable. 2 
Williston on Sales § 466 et seq; Battle Creek etc. Co. 
v. Paramount Baking Co., (1943) 88 Utah 67, 39 
p. 2d 323. Moreover the statute cited is prefaced by 
the words "unless a different intention appears". 
It does not say "appears from a writing alone". 
Here, clearly a different intention did appear. In-
tent, unless precluded by the parole evidence rule, 
(obviously not applicable here if ambiguity of the 
writing is conceded) is usually best shown by oral 
testimony. It is submitted that this statute would 
only apply in three instances: ( 1) where no refer-
ence at all to the disputed fact was made; (2) where 
the writing is ambiguous and the parties thereto 
disagree; ( 3) Where, for some reason, the parties 
have perpetuated a fraud on a third party. Clearly 
none of these apply here. 
Even more clearly, in the light of these facts, 
the intent of the parties as to the meaning of the 
contract was of material assistance to the trial court 
in interpreting this ambiguous document. One the 
16 
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testimony of the buyer and seller was received, the 
possible ambiguity disappeared. As plaintiff should 
reasonably have inquired of these parties, what he 
would have learned from such inquiry is of the 
greatest significance. 
POINT V. 
THERE IS NO RIGHT OF SALE WHICH EFFECTS 
THE PRIORITY OF APPELLANT AND RESPOND-
ENTS. 
The duty of the buyer to maintain at all times 
the same number of chickens on the property is 
coupled with the obvious fact that the life span of 
a laying hen is shorter than the term of the con tract. 
This makes it obvious that the buyer would have 
to dispose of some chickens and replace them with 
others. 
Appellant contends that this right of disposi-
tion makes defendants' rights to the chickens void 
as to appellant. This argument has two obvious 
defects. First, the authorities cited by plaintiff apply 
only to conditional sales contracts. Let us assume 
that in this case rather than use the drafting tech-
niques .actually applied, the respondents took a chat-
tel mortgage on the chickens, which expressly cover-
ed replacement. Appellant certainly would not con-
tend that the implied right to dispose of chickens 
in order to replace them deprives the first mortgagee 
of his priority as against a subsequent encumbrancer 
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with notice. of this interest. Although not as art-
fully drafted, the instant contract creates, if nothing 
else, at least an equitable mortgage in the chickens 
and their replacements. 
Second, the rule cited by appellant is taken 
from the Uniform Conditional Sales Act. On its 
face it applies only to "purchasers for value in the 
ordinary course of business." (Appellants brief, page 
28). The rule is well established by the majority 
·of decisions that the mere fact that a conditional 
buyer is authorized to resell his goods in the ordinary 
course of business does not make the sale an abso-
lute one as far as his creditors are concerned. (See 
47 Am. Jur., page 62) This court as early as 1894 
made it clear that it adhered to this view. Hirsch 
v. Steel (1894) 10 Utah 18, 36 Pac. 49. As plaintiff 
was without question a creditor of the buyer, he 
comes within the rule and the arguments advanced 
by appellant are inapplicable. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant in his conclusion attempts to argue 
the equities of this case. It is submitted they are not 
convincing. 
We have here a case where a buyer and seller 
employed counsel who, however inartistically, at-
tempted to adapt the standard clauses of the Uni-
form Real Estate Contract to the sale of a stocked 
chicken ranch. There was never any question that 
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the parties intended the contract to cover the chick-
ens and the additions to the standard form should 
make this clear to any third party with notice of it. 
After five years during which respondent had 
not even been paid enough to meet the interest pro-
vided for in the contract, charity at last had to be 
tempered by reason and the sellers took steps to 
repossess the ranch and a cash settlement was made. 
Sellers returned to a badly under-stocked and run 
down ranch which they are now attempting to run. 
Appellant knew of all of this, yet he seeks to 
take advantage of alleged verbal deficiencies sub~e­
quently ascertained to better 'his position. This at-
tempt the trial court repudiated and it is respect-
fully submitted that the judgment of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ALBERT J. COLTON 
of FABIAN, CLENDENIN, 
MOFFAT & MABEY 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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